





Ethnically divided jurisdictions tend to provide fewer public goods than ho-
mogenous ones. This paper presents a model of public goods provision in an
economy with ethnic divisions under majority voting. I ¯nd that the level of pub-
lic goods may be lower in ethnically divided economies with majority voting if
ethnically based transfers are allowed. When group speci¯c transfers are not al-
lowed, the link between ethnic divisions and public goods is broken. Regardless of
whether transfers are allowed or not, majority voting provides an e±cient level of
public goods. If transfers are allowed, policy favors some households over others.
Fairness requires that transfers be eliminated.
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11 Introduction
As more countries attempt to make the transition to democratic rule, there has been
concern about the institutions required to govern multiethnic democracies. Ethnically
divided countries seem to be more di±cult to govern. They tend to be poorer (Easterly
and Levine (1997)), have poorer institutions (Mauro (1995), La Porta, et al. (1999)) and
¯ght more civil wars (Elbawadi and Sambanis (2002)).
This paper examines the ability of multiethnic democracies to provide public
goods. Many have argued that public goods are more di±cult to provide in the presence
of ethnic divisions. Alesina and La Ferarra (2004) survey the empirical literature in a
number of countries and levels of government and ¯nd that there are fewer public goods
in ethnically divided jurisdictions.
This paper develops a theory to explain why ethnic divisions lead to lower provi-
sion of public goods. I argue that public goods are more di±cult to provide in ethnically
divided economies because there is a tension between providing public goods and redis-
tributing wealth. Other ethnic groups provide a source of resources that a group wishes
to transfer to itself. Ethnic divisions reduce public goods by diverting public spending to
transfers. Eliminating ethnic redistribution eliminates the relationship between ethnic
divisions and public goods.
In this paper, I examine public goods provision under majority voting in ethnically
divided economies. I consider a simple static endowment economy. Households are
exogenously assigned to an ethnic group. They vote on tax, subsidy and public goods
spending policy.
The model generates a number of results. I show that if group speci¯c transfers
are allowed, public goods may be lower in ethnically divided economies. When transfers
are allowed, a group can redistribute other groups' resources to itself. In ethnically
divided economies, the group that determines public spending policy is smaller than in
homogenous ones. When this group is large, the cost to each member to fund a ¯xed
level of public goods is smaller. Since the cost to a member household is lower, larger
groups are willing to fund higher levels of public goods.
However, if group speci¯c transfers are not allowed, the relationship between
ethnic divisions and public goods is broken. When groups cannot use public spending
2for transfers, no funds are diverted to redistribution. Policy preferences are divorced
from the ethnic structure of the economy. The most preferred policy of all households is
the same regardless of the ethnic makeup of the economy and the level of public goods
is una®ected by ethnic divisions.
Majority voting provides a Pareto optimal level of public goods provision, both
when transfers are and are not allowed. Given the proper weights on households, the
maximization problem that generates the winning policy is identical to the social plan-
ner's problem. However, members of di®erent groups are not treated the same under the
two mechanisms. When transfers are allowed, some households are favored over others.
To ensure fair outcomes under voting, ethnic transfers must be prohibited.
2 Evidence
2.1 Theory of Ethnicity
Despite wide interest in ethnic divisions, there is no generally accepted theory or def-
inition of ethnicity. In the literature, theories of ethnicity are often divided into two
categories: primordialist and instrumentalist.
Primordialist theories argue that the distinctions between ethnic divisions come
from fundamental di®erences between members of di®erent groups. There may be a sense
of "fellow feeling" or altruism among members of a group. Alternatively, members of
di®erent groups may simply have di®erent preferences over goods. Within the context of
public goods, di®erent ethnic groups may like di®erent public goods. Alesina, Baqir and
Easterly (1999) cite the con°ict over the Ebonics curriculum in Oakland public schools
in 1996 as an example. Primordialist theories tend to emphasize kinship links among
group members.
Instrumentalist theories argue that ethnic groups are coalitions of people who act
together to achieve a goal such as mutual protection. Members of di®erent groups do
not have di®erent preferences, they simply have joined di®erent groups. Instrumental-
ist theorists emphasize the fact the many ethnic groups are relatively recent creations,
including the Igbo in Nigeria and Manyika in Zimbabwe. (Posner (2003))
In this paper, I use a theory of ethnicity that is a synthesis of the two approaches.
3While members of an ethnic group do not have di®erent preferences than members of
other groups, they do have an observable and permanent (but inessential) mark. This
approach accords theory that claims ethnic groups are coalitions (as in the instrumen-
talist view) that use heritable marks to prevent free riding (as in the primordialist view).
Examples of this type of theory include Caselli and Coleman (2001) and Fearon (1999).
2.2 Measuring Ethnic Divisions
Before discussing the a®ect of ethnic divisions on public goods, we must de¯ne a mea-
sure of ethnic divisions. The most common measure in the literature is Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization (ELF). ELF is calculated as follows. A country's total population N
is divided into J groups, with each group's population denoted by Ni: ELF is given by








This variable increases as (1) more groups are added (J increases) and (2) when the
populations of groups become more equal. The theoretical experiments in this paper are
constructed to correspond to changes in ELF.
2.3 Literature
Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) survey the empirical literature on ethnic heterogeneity
and public goods and ¯nd that ethnically heterogenous jurisdictions generally spend less
on public goods and that the spending is less e®ective1.
A large part of the literature examines the e®ects of ethnic diversity on public
spending. One strand uses data from localities. For example, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly
(1999) ¯nd that ethnic diversity a®ects the composition of public goods provided in
cities in the United States. Greater ethnic diversity is associated with lower provision
of productive public goods. Poterba (1997) ¯nds that local jurisdictions in the United
States with a higher share of elderly residents decreases spending on local schools. The
1The discussion that follows is not comprehensive. Alesina and La Ferrara (2003) provide a more
detailed survey of the literature.
4e®ect is particularly strong if school aged children are of a di®erent race than that of the
elderly. Miguel (2001) ¯nds that higher local ethnic diversity in Kenyan school districts
leads to lower funding and worse school facilities. Another strand examines cross country
data. McCarty (1993) ¯nds that ethnically diverse countries spend less on public goods.
There is a literature looking at the e®ects of heterogeneity on the productivity
of governments. Kuijs (2000) argues that nations with higher levels of ethnic diversity
have less e±cient public goods. Spending is less e®ective in the sense that each unit
of spending on a public good brings fewer results. For example, health spending in
a ethnically fractionalized community will result in worse health outcomes than in a
homogenous one. LaPorta, et al. (1999) ¯nd that governments in ethnically diverse
countries are perceived as being less e®ective.
Ethnic divisions are also associated with ethnically based transfers. There have
been a number of cases where public policy has explicitly treated ethnic groups di®er-
entially. In some instances, publicly provided goods are segregated by race. Examples
include the Jim Crow American South and Apartheid South Africa. In other cases, the
wealth of particular ethnic groups are expropriated. Examples include Idi Amin's ex-
propriation of South Asians in Uganda and Mobutu's \Zairianization" program in the
Congo (formerly Zaire).
However, transfers are not always explicit. If ethnic groups are geographically
concentrated, the government can concentrate spending in districts dominated by favored
groups. For example, Barkan and Chege (1989) examine public spending in Kenya in the
1980s. Kenya is ethnically divided and the population is relatively segregated by district.
There is some data on public spending by district. They compare the public expenditures
by region after Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin, replaced Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, as
President of Kenya in 1978. In the 1979/80 budget, 44 percent of road construction
went to districts the authors identify as part Kenyatta's ethnic base compared to 32
percent for Moi's base. By the late 1980s, the percentages had shifted to around 20
percent and 65 percent respectively. (The populations of the two areas were equal.)
Redistribution also takes the form of patronage. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly
(2000) ¯nd that racially heterogeneous localities in the United States have larger public
employment than homogenous ones. They suggest that this is a transfer to ethnically
5de¯ned interest groups. Changes in ethnicity of the leadership of cities in the United
States provides additional evidence. Eisinger (1980) ¯nds that cities that elect African-
American mayors expand public employment of minorities faster than other cities. The
portion of public contracts that went to minority owned ¯rms also expanded rapidly.
Erie (1997) shows that Irish control of city governments in the late nineteenth century
led to large increases in Irish public employment.
3 Model
There is a single period. At the beginning of the period, each household is endowed with
a unit of output !. Output can be divided between two goods: a private consumption
good c and a public good G.
3.1 Households
There are N households. Each household is a member of an exogenously given group.
There are J groups. The name of the group household i belongs to is j(i). There are Nj
members in group j.
3.2 Preferences
Households have preferences over its consumption of the private consumption good and
the public good. These preferences are represented by:
U = u(ci) + v(G) (3.1)
Preferences satisfy a few standard assumptions. The functions u and v are strictly
increasing and C2. The function u is strictly concave and limc!0 u0(c) = 1: The function
v is concave.
63.3 Mechanism
Public goods are provided by a government using taxation. The government's tax and
spending policy is determined by majority voting.
A policy is a tax schedule f¿igI
i=1 and a level of the public good G. Each household
simultaneously votes for one policy. The policy with the most votes is enacted. In the
case of ties for ¯rst place, a policy is chosen at random from the set of winners with
equal probability of each policy winning.
I restrict attention to policies that are feasible. Taxes may not be greater than
income: ¿i · 1; for all i. In addition, the level of public goods must be feasible given the
tax schedule:
P
i2I ¿i! = G. Note that negative taxes (subsidies) are possible.
Let ¦ be the space of feasible policies and ¼ be an element of that space. Majority
voting is a mechanism ¤ that maps policy votes into a policy. Formally, ¤ : ¦I ! ¦.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 De¯nition
The majority voting mechanism de¯nes a game between households. A strategy for a
household is a policy vote ¼i and the payo® is the utility for the resulting policy. Let
¼ = f¿ig;G. De¯ne Ui(¼) = u(!(1¡¿i))+v(G). I analyze Nash equilibria of this game.
De¯nition 4.1. An equilibrium is a vector of policy votes f¼¤
igI





2. For each household, U(¤(¼¤
i;¼¤
¡i)) ¸ Ui(¤(¼0;¼¤
¡i)) for all ¼0 2 ¦.
It is possible that households may not vote their true preferences and vote for
policies that are not their most preferred policy. Equilibria such that each household
votes its true preferences are called truthful.
De¯nition 4.2. An equilibrium is truthful if for each household's vote ¼¤
i, EUi(¼¤
i) ¸
EUi(¼0) for all ¼0 2 ¦.
74.2 Existence
I vary ethnic divisions along two margins. I analyze the case with two groups of di®erent
sizes and the case with an arbitrary number of groups of equal size. These cases capture
the two major ways in which the variable ELF can be increased: Making groups more
equal and adding groups. Therefore, variation in ethnic divisions in the theoretical results
match the variation in the data used in most empirical work.
Formally, I will analyze the case where J = 2 and Nj varies and the case where
Nj = N
J holding the total population N constant. There is a potential problem with
the second case in that Nj may not be an integer. While the interpretation of fractional
households (and votes) may be problematic, it does not a®ect the mathematics of the
results. Therefore, I will ignore these concerns in what follows. Further, I assume that
Nj > 1 for all j throughout. This assumption eliminates trivial cases where a group is a
single (or fraction of a) household.
I show that an equilibrium exists for these cases under certain restrictions on
policy. I impose restrictions that require that similar households must be taxed at the
same rate. I will consider two equal treatment restrictions: group speci¯c and anonymous
taxes.
Group speci¯c taxes is the less restrictive equal treatment condition. It requires
that all members of a group be taxed at the same rate. A group speci¯c tax schedule is
a vector of taxes such that ¿i = ¿i0 for all i;i0 such that j(i) = j(i0):
Anonymous taxes require all households, regardless of group, to be taxed at the
same rate. An anonymous tax schedule is a vector of taxes such that ¿i = ¿i0 for all i;i0:
In general, there is not a unique equilibrium. It will typically be the case that a
household's vote will not a®ect the outcome of the mechanism. That is, that household's
vote is not decisive. Formally, a voter i is decisive if ¤(¼i;¼¡i) 6= ¤(¼0
i;¼¡i) for some
policy pair ¼i;¼0
i 2 ¦, where ¼i 6= ¼0
i. Unless it is decisive, a household is indi®erent to
voting for any policy.
There is a great deal of multiplicity of equilibria, since the lack of decisiveness can
generate perverse self-ful¯lling equilibria. In fact, any admissible policy is an outcome
of majority voting. If all households vote for a policy, no household will be decisive.
Therefore, no household has an incentive to deviate and the vote is an equilibrium. I
8will concentrate on truthful equilibria.
4.2.1 Group Speci¯c Taxation
The following lemmas show that with the equal treatment restrictions each group has a
most preferred policy.
Lemma 4.3. If policies are restricted to group speci¯c taxes, then there exists a most
preferred policy for each group.
Proof. A policy under the restriction is summarized by f¿1;:::;¿Jg: WLOG, let j(i) = 1.









u((1 ¡ ¿1)!) + v(G) (4.1)




Under the concavity assumptions, this problem has a unique solution.
Group speci¯c taxation aligns the incentives of the members of each group. With-
out the restriction, each household would have its own preferred policy where it paid little
or no tax (perhaps even received a subsidy) while other households funded public spend-
ing. Group speci¯c taxes prevents households from voting for policies with individual
subsidies.
The preferred policies are very stark, with taxpayers outside the group facing 100
percent taxation. In reality, there are number of reasons that taxes are not 100 percent,
including distortions, evasion and institutional limits on taxation. However, the lemma
9does capture the intuition that minority taxpayers contribute more to public spending
than those from the majority.
I ¯rst consider voting with two groups. The following proposition shows that a
truthful equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4.4. Let J = 2 and N1 6= N2: If the policy be restricted to either group
speci¯c taxes, then a truthful equilibrium exists.
Proof. First, I show that if all other households vote truthfully, then voting truthfully
is a weakly dominant strategy. If a household is not decisive, its vote does not a®ect
the policy selected and it is indi®erent to any vote. Only majority households can be
decisive. If a majority household is decisive and all other majority households are voting
for the majority's most preferred policy, it is a dominant strategy to also vote for the
majority's most preferred policy.
By the lemma, both groups have a most preferred policy. The larger group has
a majority and the most preferred policy its members will always win under majority
voting.
With two groups, one group is a majority unless the population is evenly split.
Since each member of a group has the same preferred policy, the majority's favored policy
will always win.
A truthful equilibrium also exists when there are more than two groups.
Proposition 4.5. Let Nj = N
J : If policies are restricted to group speci¯c taxes, then a
truthful equilibrium exists.
Proof. If all other households vote truthfully, then voting truthfully is a dominant strat-
egy. Since all groups are the same size, each household is decisive. Each group is the
same size, so if each household votes truthfully there is a tie between J di®erent policies.
Under the tie breaking rule, there is 1
J probability that a household's preferred policy
¿¤
j(i);G¤ is enacted. If it does not, its its most preferred policy will not be enacted.
A household will not want to deviate from a truthful vote. Note that all house-
holds prefer the same level of public goods (G¤). If a household votes for another policy,
another group's most preferred policy will be enacted. Therefore ¿i = 1 and ci = 0 The
10expected utility of a deviation is u(0) + V (G¤) which is less than the expected utility of
the household's most preferred policy: 1
Ju((1¡¿¤
j(i))!)+(1¡ 1
J)u(0)+V (G¤). (Note that
¿¤
j(i) < 1 due to the Inada condition on u(c).) Therefore voting truthfully is a dominant
strategy for each household if other households vote truthfully and a truthful equilibrium
exists.
When groups are the same size, each group most preferred policy ties under
truthful voting. The tie breaking mechanism randomizes over these policies. A household
is strictly better o® with a chance of its policy being enacted compared to any other vote.
Therefore, truthful voting is a dominant strategy when other households vote truthfully.
4.2.2 Anonymous Taxation
There is a similar lemma when policy is limited to anonymous taxation.
Lemma 4.6. Let ¿i = ¿i0 for all i;i0: Then there exists a most preferred policy for each
group.
Proof. A policy under the restriction can be summarized by ¿: A household's most pre-
ferred policy is the solution to:
max
¿
u((1 ¡ ¿)!) + v(G) (4.2)
s.t. : !¿N = G
Under the concavity assumptions, this equation has a unique solution.
The intuition for this result is similar to that of the previous lemma. Under
group speci¯c taxation, households are prevented from voting for policies that bene¯t
them individually at the expense of other households. With anonymous taxation, they
are prevented from voting for policies that bene¯t their group at the expense of other
groups. Policy can be summarized by a single tax rate.
A truthful equilibrium exists under anonymous taxation.
Lemma 4.7. It taxes are restricted to anonymous taxation, then a truthful equilibrium
exists.
11Proof. If all other households vote truthfully, then truthful voting is a weakly dominant
strategy. Since all households have the same preferences, all other votes are the same.
Therefore, the household is not decisive and voting truthfully is weakly preferred and a
truthful equilibrium exists.
Under anonymous taxation, the preferred policy of each group is the same. Under
truthful voting, all households vote for the same policy. No household is decisive, so any
vote yields the same utility. Therefore, truthful voting is an equilibrium.
5 Results
This section analyzes the relationship between ethnic divisions and public goods provi-
sion.
5.1 Group Speci¯c Taxes
I begin by examining public goods provision when transfers are allowed. I put more
structure on the model by analyzing a CES utility function. The following proposition
shows that ethnic divisions are associated with a lower level of public goods with group
speci¯c taxes.
Proposition 5.1. Let J = 2 and N1 6= N2: Let u(c) = c1¡¾
1¡¾ ;¾ 2 (0;1) and v(G) =
B(G)µ;µ 2 (0;1]. If taxes are restricted to group speci¯c schedules, then G¤(N0
1) >
G¤(N1) if N0
1 > N1 and G¤(N0
1) > 0.
Proof. Under the concavity conditions, if a preferred policy is interior the ¯rst order
conditions are necessary and su±cient. Further, the only non-interior solution possible
is G = 0. The condition G¤(N0
1) > 0 eliminates the trivial case of no public goods
provision. If G¤(N1) = 0, the result follows trivially.
The majority's policy will always win. If G¤(N1) > 0, the level of public goods is
determined by the majority's preferred policy problem. The ¯rst order conditions of the
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Since ¾ · 1 and ° > 1, °
1¡¾
¾
N > 1: The left hand side is strictly increasing in °G. For the
expression to be true, °G > 1. Therefore, public goods provision is higher when group
one is larger.
Group speci¯c taxation allows for transfers of private consumption. The majority
can expropriate the minority's resources and treat it as its own for a mix of private
consumption and the public good.
There are two e®ects: a substitution e®ect and an income e®ect.
When the majority is large, the cost to each member to fund a ¯xed level of the
public good is smaller. The contribution is spread out over a large number of households.
Since the cost to a member household is lower, larger majorities are willing to fund a
higher level of the public good.
The income e®ect runs counter to the substitution e®ect. A smaller minority
means that there are fewer resources for the majority to expropriate. A larger majority
implies that member households are \poorer," net of available transfers. The amount
that each majority household can expropriate is lower. The public good is a normal
good. When members of the majority are richer they prefer more of it.
The level of public goods depends on which force dominates: the income e®ect
or the substitution e®ect. The elasticity of private consumption determines which e®ect
13dominates. When demand of private consumption is inelastic (¾ < 1), the size e®ect
dominates and public goods are higher with greater ethnic homogeneity.
A similar result can be proven for an arbitrary number of groups.
Proposition 5.2. Let Nj = N
J : Let u(c) = c1¡¾
1¡¾ ;¾ 2 (0;1) and v(G) = B(G)µ;µ 2 (0;1].
If taxes are restricted to group speci¯c schedules, then G¤(J0) < G¤(J) if J0 > J where
G¤(J) > 0
Proof. Similar to J = 2 case.
When groups are the same size, no group is assured of winning the vote as they
are in the two group case. However, the forces at work in determining a household's
most preferred policy is the same. Therefore, the intuition for this proposition is the
same as in the two group case.
While the policy that is chosen depends on how ties are resolved, the relationship
between ethnic divisions and public goods is more robust. All groups prefer the same
level of public goods. Policies con°ict only on the relative tax burden of each group. Al-
ternative tie breaking rules, assuming that they induce truthful voting, would reproduce
the result.
5.2 Anonymous Taxation
Anonymous taxes eliminate the ability of any group to expropriate other groups. If all
taxpayers must be treated equally, the majority cannot use the minority as a source
of funds. There is no longer a con°ict between private transfers and public spending.
Equal treatment breaks the link between the distribution of the population and the level
of public goods. The level of public goods is the same for any arbitrary distribution of
the population.
Proposition 5.3. Let J(k) and Nj(k) de¯ne two distributions of groups where
P
j Nj(k) =
N for k = 1;2. Let G¤(k) be the equilibrium level of public goods under anonymous
taxation given distribution k = 1;2. Then G¤(1) = G¤(2).
14Proof. Given a distribution of groups, all households have the same most preferred policy.
Therefore that policy will win in truthful voting. Moreover, the most preferred policy is
the same regardless of the distribution of groups.
Anonymous taxation requires that all households be taxed at the same level.
Therefore, the problem that determines most preferred policy is the same for members
of di®erent groups. Under truthful voting, all households vote for the same policy.
The most preferred policy is the same regardless of the distribution of groups.
Since there cannot be group speci¯c taxes, the distribution of groups becomes irrelevant
to a household's policy preferences. Redistribution is the only policy margin where ethnic
divisions matter. Without group based transfers, policy preferences are divorced from
the ethnic structure of the economy. The most preferred policy of all households is the
same regardless of the ethnic makeup of the economy. Since all households have the same
preferences, this policy wins in truthful voting and the equilibrium level of the public
good is invariant to the distribution of the economy.
6 Welfare
In this section, I examine welfare and show that voting generates Pareto optimal alloca-
tions.
Pareto optimal allocations are de¯ned by the solution to the social planner's









ci + G · N!
The level of the public good provided using the majority voting mechanism is
Pareto e±cient in all the cases considered above. This result is true despite the fact
that the level of public good provided is di®erent under group speci¯c and anonymous
15taxation. While they are both Pareto e±cient, the implied weights of the social planner
are di®erent. I begin by considering the group speci¯c taxation.
Proposition 6.1. Let J = 2: Let N1 6= N2: If taxes are restricted to group speci¯c
schedules, then the outcome of the voting is Pareto optimal.
Proof. WLOG, let N1 > N2: Under majority voting, each household in a group gets
the same consumption. Therefore, the social planner's weights are the same for each
member of a group. De¯ne ®j(i) = ®i for i 2 j(i): Consider the social planner's weights




u(c1) + v(G) (6.1)
s.t. : c1N1 + G = N!
Rede¯ning c1 = (1¡¿1)!, the planner's problem is the same as the household's problem
in the decentralized problem under group speci¯c taxation.
A similar result can be shown for the case with an arbitrary number of groups.
Proposition 6.2. Let Nj = N
J : If taxes are restricted to group speci¯c schedules, then
the outcome of the voting is Pareto optimal.
Proof. The realized policy is a random draw. Let i¤ be group whose most preferred
policy wins. Similar to J = 2 case, the social planner's problem can be rewritten to be
the same as the household's problem for members of group i¤.
With group speci¯c taxes, the voting mechanism generates the same results as
a social planner that only puts positive weight on the group whose policy wins. The
other groups are expropriated and the proceeds are spent to maximize the utility of the
winning group.
The outcome under anonymous taxation is also Pareto optimal.
Proposition 6.3. If taxes are restricted to anonymous schedules, then the outcome of
the voting is Pareto optimal.
16Proof. Consider the social planner's weights ®j = 1 for all j. Under this restriction, all
households will receive the same consumption. The social planner's problem is:
max
c
u(c) + v(G) (6.2)
s.t. : cN + G = N!
Rede¯ning c = (1 ¡ ¿)!, the planner's problem is the same as the household's problem
in the decentralized problem under anonymous taxation.
The intuition for this result is the same as the group speci¯c taxation results.
Given the proper weights on households, the problem that generates the winning policy
is the same as the social planner's problem. Anonymous taxation requires equal weight
on all households.
While voting under both group speci¯c and anonymous taxation generates Pareto
optimal outcomes, the allocations are di®erent. Group speci¯c taxation strongly favors
one winning group and ignores all other groups. Anonymous taxation requires that each
household be treated the same.
The theory provides a possible explanation for the use of public employment for
redistribution even though it is an ine±cient means of transfers. The ruling group would
prefer a system that allows group speci¯c treatment. However, there are often constraints
that prevent explicit ethnic transfers. These constraints include political constraints such
as the threat of armed resistance and legal constraints such as the 14th Amendment of US
Constitution, which requires states to treat ethnic groups equally. Redistributive public
employment may allow the ruling group to maintain the appearance of equal treatment
while reintroducing group speci¯c treatment. Oversta±ng public projects with ethnic
clients acts as de facto group speci¯c treatment.
This analysis is related to Coate and Morris (1995). They present a model where
politicians have an incentive to make transfers to special interests and voters have im-
perfect information about politicians and the e®ects of public spending and show that
politicians may use ine±cient, opaque means of transfers. While they do not empha-
size ethnic special interests, their analysis may apply to ethnically divided jurisdictions.
17Politicians have an incentive to make transfers to their ethnic base while voters typically
have imperfect information about the most e±cient level of public employment.
Since the model is an endowment economy, taxation is not distorting. The welfare
results are not sensitive to this fact. The results obtain for a case with endogenous labor
supply. Under the restrictions given in the model, voting acts as a social planner with
di®erent weights on individuals depending on the particular restrictions. This arti¯cial
social planner's (second best) solution will be the same as the actual social planner's
even with the addition of endogenous labor.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops theory to explain why public goods provision is lower in ethnically
divided countries. Ethnic coalitions may divert public resources away from public goods
to ethnically based transfers. Those transfers make the outcomes of democratic voting
unfair despite each person having a vote. Requiring equal protection eliminates the
e®ect of ethnic divisions on public goods. In addition, it ensures that the outcome of the
democratic process is fair.
Liberal democracy is typically conceived of as requiring more than giving each
person a vote. Government policy should treat each citizen equally. Majority voting
alone is insu±cient for the political process to be fair when there are ethnic divisions.
Policy must be constrained to prevent ethnic transfers to ensure fair outcomes.
The theory provides guidance for creating institutions in multiethnic democracies.
While there are tensions between ethnic groups that do not exist in homogenous democ-
racies, the e®ect of these tensions on policy outcomes can be eliminated by enforcing
equal protection.
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